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Abstract: Properly locating sensor nodes is an important building block for a large subset
of wireless sensor networks (WSN) applications. As a result, the performance of the WSN
degrades significantly when misbehaving nodes report false location and distance informa-
tion in order to fake their actual location. In this paper we propose a general distributed
deterministic protocol for accurate identification of faking sensors in a WSN. Our scheme
does not rely on a subset of trusted nodes that are not allowed to misbehave and are known
to every node in the network. Thus, any subset of nodes is allowed to try faking its position.
As in previous approaches, our protocol is based on distance evaluation techniques developed
for WSN.
On the positive side, we show that when the received signal strength (RSS) technique
is used, our protocol handles at most ⌊n2 ⌋ − 2 faking sensors. Also, when the time of flight
(ToF) technique is used, our protocol manages at most ⌊n2 ⌋ − 3 misbehaving sensors. On
the negative side, we prove that no deterministic protocol can identify faking sensors if their
number is ⌈n2 ⌉− 1. Thus our scheme is almost optimal with respect to the number of faking
sensors.
We discuss application of our technique in the trusted sensor model. More precisely our
results can be used to minimize the number of trusted sensors that are needed to defeat
faking ones.
Key-words: Wireless Sensor Network, Secure Positioning, Distributed Protocol, Faking
Sensor.
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Localisation déterministe et sécurisée dans les réseaux
de capteurs
Résumé : Localiser correctement des capteurs autonomes est une brique de base importante
pour un grand nombre d’applications dans les réseaux de capteurs (WSN). En effet, l’efficacité
du WSN est significativement dégradée quand des nœuds malicieux rapportent de fausses
positions et de fausses informations de distance de manière à simuler une localisation fictive.
Dans cet article, nous proposons une solution algorithmique distribuée pour l’identification
exacte des capteurs malicieux dans un WSN. Notre approche n’est pas basée sur l’utilisation
d’un sous-ensemble de nœuds“de confiance”qui serait connu de chaque autre nœud du WSN.
Ainsi, tout sous-ensemble des participants peut essayer de tricher sur sa position. Comme
dans les approches précédentes, notre protocole est basé sur des techniques d’évaluation des
distances développées pour les WSN.
Nous montrons que quand la technique de la force du signal reçu (RSS) est utilisée,
notre protocole peut tolérer au plus ⌊n2 ⌋ − 2 nœuds malicieux. De plus, quand la technique
du temps de vol (ToF) est utilisée, notre protocole peut gérer au plus ⌊n2 ⌋ − 3 tricheurs.
Nous montrons également qu’il est impossible pour un protocole déterministe d’identifier
les nœuds malicieux si leur nombre est au moins égal à ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1, ce qui rend notre résultat
presque optimal en ce qui concerne le nombre de nœuds malicieux tolérés.
Nous discutons l’application de notre technique au modèle où il existe des nœuds de
confiance. Plus précisément, nos résultats peuvent être utilisés pour minimiser le nombre de
nœuds de confiance nécessaires à la détection sans faille des nœuds malicieux.
Mots-clés : Réseaux de capteurs sans fil, localisation sécurisée, algorithme distribué,
capteurs malicieux.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Properly locating sensor nodes is an important building block for a large subset of wireless
sensor networks (WSN) applications. For example, environment and habitat monitoring [20],
surveillance and tracking for military [10] or civilian purpose, both require the knowledge
of the location where a particular event takes place. Location of nodes in a WSN can also
be used for location based routing algorithms (such as geographic routing [14]), or location
based services.
Most of existing position verification protocols rely on distance evaluation techniques
(e.g. [1, 9, 11, 19, 21, 22]). Received signal strength (RSS) [1] and time of flight (ToF) [9]
techniques are relatively easy to implement yet very precise (one or two meters). In the RSS
technique, receiving sensor estimates the distance of the sender on the basis of sending and
receiving signal strengths. In the ToF technique, sensor estimates distance based on mes-
sage delay and radio signal propagation time. Position verification using the aforementioned
distance estimation techniques is relatively straighforward provided that all sensors coop-
erate. However, this task becomes challenging in the presence of misbehaving nodes that
are allowed to report false position and distance information in order to fake their actual
position. In the following such nodes are denoted as faking or cheating nodes.
Such misbehaviors could occur due to several factors: a sensor may malfunction due
to improper sensor deployment, partial communication problem due objects in the vicinity,
or inaccurate position (coordinates) estimation. We consider that misbehaving sensors are
unaware that they are malfunctioning, so locally they properly execute the protocol that is
given to all nodes. Nevertheless, they can report incorrect position, change signal strength
(when the RSS technique is used), or report incorrect transmission time (when the ToF
technique is used).
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1.1 Related Work
Most methods [3, 4, 16, 15] existing in the literature that use distance estimation techniques
to detect and filter out faking nodes are based on the availability of a few fixed trusted entities
(or verifiers), that are equipped with GPS. We refer to this model as the trusted sensor (or
TS ) model. In this model, the faking nodes may use attacks not available to regular nodes,
such as radio signal jamming or using directional antenas, that permit to implement e.g.
wormhole attack [12] and Sybil attack [8]. Lazos and Poovendran [15] present a secure
range-independent localization scheme, where each sensor computes its position based on
received beacons messages from locators. Sensors compute the center of gravity of beacons’s
intersection region, and the computed location becomes the estimated location of the sensor.
Probabilistic analysis of the protocol demonstrate that it is resilient to wormhole and Sybil
attacks, with high probability. Lazos et al. [16] further refine this scheme with multilateration
to reduce the number of required locator, while maintaining probabilistic guarantees. The
protocol of Capkun and Hubaux [4] relies on a distance bounding technique proposed by
Brands and Chaum [2]. Each sensor v measures its distance to a (potential) faking sensor u
based on its message round-trip delay and radio signal propagation time, thus enabling the
faking node u only to enlarge the distance to v. Then, if the faking node is located inside the
triangle formed by verifiers and its faked position is also located within the triangle, then
at least one of the three verifiers detects an inconsistency. Capkun, Cagalj, Srivastava [3] is
supported by powerful verifiers, that know their positions and communicate with some wired
channels that prevent faking nodes to locate them or to listen their transmissions. Then, each
verifier v measures the arrival time tv of the (potential) faking node transmission. Verifiers
exchange all such arrival times and check consistency of the declared position. However, the
TS model presents several drawback in WSNs: first the network can not self-organize in an
entirely distributed manner, and second the trusted nodes have to be checked regularly and
manually to actually remain trusted.
Relaxing the assumption of trusted nodes makes the problem more challenging, and to
our knowledge, has only been investigated very recently [13]. We call this model where
no trusted node preexists the no trusted sensor (or NTS ) model. The approach of [13] is
randomized and consists of two phases: distance measurement and filtering. In the distance
measurement phase, sensors measure their distances to their neighbors, faking sensors being
allowed to corrupt the distance measure technique. In the filtering phase each correct sensor
randomly picks up 2 so-called pivot sensors. Next each sensor v uses trilateration with
respect to the chosen pivot sensors to compute the location of its neighbor u. If there is a
match between the announced location and the computed location, the (u, v) link is added
to the network, otherwise it is discarded. Of course, the chosen pivot sensors could be faking
and lying, so the protocol may only give probabilistic guarantee.
In this paper we present a deterministic protocol that performs in the NTS model and
where every correct (i.e. non faking) node: (i) identifies the positions (coordinates) of all
correct nodes, and (ii) identifies the faking nodes (if any). The goal of the faking nodes is
to convince the correct nodes that they are located in a fake position.
INRIA
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1.2 Our results
The main contribution of this paper is a secure deterministic positioning protocol, FindMap,
in the NTS model. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first deterministic protocol for this
problem in the NTS model. The basic version of the protocol assumes that faking sensors
are not able to mislead distance evaluation techniques. Then, our protocol correctly filters
out faking sensors provided they are at most ⌈n2 ⌉ − 2. Conversely, we show evidence that it
in the same setting, it is impossible to deterministically solve the problem when the number
of faking sensors is at least ⌈n2 ⌉−1. We then extend the protocol do deal with faking sensors
that are also allowed to corrupt the distance measure technique (RSS or ToF). In the case
of RSS, our protocol tolerates at most ⌊n2 ⌋− 2 faking sensors (provided that no four sensors
are located on the same circle and no three sensors are co-linear). In the case of ToF, our
protocol may handle up to ⌊n2 ⌋ − 3 faking sensors (provided that no six sensors are located
on the same hyperbola and no three sensors are co-linear).
Our results have significant impact on secure positioning in the TS model as well. The
TS protocol presented by Capkun et al. [3] relies on set of hidden stations, that detect
inconsistencies between measured distance and distance computed from claimed coordinates,
using ToF-like technique to estimate the distance. Our detailed analysis shows that six
hidden stations (verifiers) are sufficient to detect inconsistency in the same setting. In [3],
the authors conjecture that the ToF-like technique could be replaced with RSS technique.
Our results anwser positively to the open question of [3], improving the number of needed
stations to four. So, in the TS model, our results can be used to efficiently deploy a minimal
number trusted stations.
RR n° 9999
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Chapter 2
Technical preliminaries
We assume that every node is able to communicate to every other node in the WSN. The size
of the WSN is n and is known to every node. Each node is also aware of its own geographic
coordinates, and those coordinates are used to identify nodes. The WSN is partially syn-
chronous: every node operates in rounds. In one round, every node is able to send exactly
one message to every other node wihout collision occuring. For each transmission, a correct
nodes uses the same transmission power Ss.
Faking nodes are allowed to transmit incorrect coordinates (and thus incorrect identifier)
to the other nodes. In the basic protocol, faking nodes can not corrupt distance measure
techniques, while in Section 4 we relax this assumption and allow faking sensors to change
its radio transmitter power and send a related fake position to the correct nodes. In Section
5 a faking sensor also can report incorrect transmission time. Also, we assume that faking
nodes may cooperate between themselves in an omniscient manner (i.e. without exchanging
messages) in order to fool the correct nodes in the WSN.
We assume that all distance estimation techniques are perfect with respect to precision.
The distance computed by node v to node u based on a distance estimation technique is
denoted by d̂(v, u). The distance computed by v to the node u using coordinates provided
by u is denoted by d(v, u). A particular sensor v detects inconsistency on distance (i.e.
position) of sensor u if d(v, u) 6= d̂(v, u). Our protocols rely on detecting and reporting such
inconsistencies.
In the remaining of the paper, we use three distance estimation techniques:
1. In the received signal strength (RSS ) technique we assume that each node can precisely
measure the distance to the transmitting node from RSS by Frii’s transmission equation
2.1 [17]:
Sr = Ss
(
λ
4πd
)2
(2.1)
RR n° 9999
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Where Ss is the transmission power of the sender, Sr is the remaining power or receive
signal strength (RSS) of the wave at receiver, λ is wave length and d is distance between
sender and receiver.
2. The synchronous time of flight (SToF ) technique relies on propagation time of the
radio signal. For this technique we assume that sensors are synchronized by global
time. Sender u attaches the time of transmission, ts to the message. The receiver
v records the message arrival time tr of the message. Next v computes the distance
d = t ∗ s of u based on time delay t = tr − ts of the message and radio signal speed s.
3. The different arrival time (DAT ) technique provides similar guarantees as SToF. The
advantage of DAT over SToF is that DAT does not require synchronization. In the
DAT technique each sensor transmits its message with two types of signals that differ
on propagation speed e.g. radio signal (RF) and ultra sound signal (US). Sender
sensor u transmits its message with RF and US signal simultaneously. Receiver sensor
v, which estimates its distance to sender u, records arrival time tr of RF signal and
arrival time tu of US signal from u. Then, based on the propagation speed sr of RF,
propagation speed su of US and difference of arrival times t = tu − tr sensor v can
compute distance to sensor u. Equation 2.2 show the relation.
t =
d̂
sr
− d̂
su
(2.2)
INRIA
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Chapter 3
Basic Protocol
In this section we present the protocol FindMap, that essentially performs by majority
voting. The protocol detects all faking sensors provided that n − 2 − f > f . Thus the
total number of faking sensors is at most ⌈n2 ⌉ − 2. In this section we consider the relatively
simpler case where faking sensors are not able to cheat the distance estimation techniques
(see above) that are used by the correct nodes. Our second key assumption is that no three
correct sensors are co-linear. This assumption allows to formulate the following fact.
Fact 1 If a faking sensor transmits a message with a fake position then at least one of three
correct sensors can detect an inconsistency (see Figure 3.1).
Based on Fact 1, we can develop FindMap(threshold). The protocol operates in two
rounds. The protocol is paremeterized by a threshold parameter. In Round 1 all sensors
exchange their coordinates by transmitting an initial message. Next each node v computes
the distances d̂(v, u) (from the distance estimation technique) and d(v, u) (from the obtained
node coordinates) of u and compare them. If d̂(v, u) 6= d(v, u) then v accuses u to fake its
3
F
F’
P
P
P
1
2
Figure 3.1: Example in which sensor F consistently fakes its location to F ′ against sensors
P1 and P2. However the third sensor P3 always detects an inconsistency since no three
correct sensors are co-linear.
RR n° 9999
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position. Otherwise v does not accuse u. To keep record of its accusations, each node
v maintain an array accusv of size n. In Round 2 each node v exchanges its array of
accusations. Next each node v counts accusations toward every other node u including
its own accusations. A sensor v detects a sensor u as faking if the number of accusations
is at least equal to the threshold parameter. For our basic FindMap protocol we use
threshold = ⌊n2 ⌋.
Protocol FindMap(threshold = ⌊n2 ⌋)
Round 1:
1. v exchange coordinates by transmiting initv and receiving n− 1 messages.
2. for each received message initu:
3. compute d̂(v, u) and d(v, u) using the coordinates of u.
4. if (d̂(v, u) 6= d(v, u)) then accusv[u]← true
5. else accusv[u]← false
Round 2:
6. v exchange accusations by transmiting accusv and receiving n− 1 accusations.
7. for each received accusu:
8. for r = 1 to n
9. if accusu[r] = true then NumAccusr+ = 1
10. for each sensor u:
11. if (threshold ≤ NumAccusu) then v considers u is faking.
Theorem 1 Protocol FindMap(⌊n2 ⌋) identifies all the faking sensors and finds the position
of correct sensors provided n− f − 2 > f .
Proof: First we will show that each faking sensors will be accused by proper number
of correct sensors. In each subset of three correct sensors there exists at least one which
detects inconsistency on distance to a faking sensors. This is guaranteed by fact 1. Thus each
faking sensors will be accused by at least n− f − 2 correct sensors. Inequality n− f − 2 > f
guarantees that number of correct sensors is at least ⌊n2 ⌋. We can also observe that each
correct sensors can be accused by at most ⌈n2 ⌉−2 faking sensors. However this is not enough
to find a correct sensors faking. 2
Next we show that it is impossible to detect the real location of correct sensors and filter
out the faking one when n− 2− f ≤ f . The assumption that faking sensors cannot corrupt
the distance ranging technique makes this result even stronger. Our protocol is synchronous
but this impossibility result holds for asynchronous settings too.
Theorem 2 If n− f − 2 ≤ f then the real location of the correct sensors cannot be detected
by a deterministic protocol.
Proof: Let us assume that correct sensors run a protocol P , which allows to detect
location of correct sensors and identify the faking sensors even when n− f − 2 = f . In case
n− f − 2 < f we make some faking sensors correct to achieve equality and in case n is odd
one of the faking sensors will remain silent. Let us consider the first execution (see figure
INRIA
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uvl
C’ − virtual correct nodes
C − correct nodes
Γ
Γ
’−virtual faking nodes
− faking nodes
Figure 3.2: First execution.
3.2). There are two correct sensors v and u located on the straight line l. There are two
sets of sensors C-correct sensors and Γ-faking sensors located on the lower half of the plane.
The sizes of the sets are equal |C| = |Γ| = f . The sensors in Γ are trying to convince sensors
v and u that they are located in Γ′ on the other side of the straight line l symmetrically.
Each sensor in Γ behave as if it was a correct sensor reflected symmetrically against straight
line l. The sensors in Γ′ are called virtual faking sensors. Virtual sensors in Γ′ execute
the protocol as if sensors in C were faking and their correct location was in C′, which is
symmetric reflection of C against straight line l. Construction of the second execution will
clarify why we need such behavior of sensors in Γ′. We can see that sensors v and u are not
able to detect inconsistency directly on the distance of virtual faking sensors since symmetry
preserves their distances from v and u. By our assumption about correctness of the protocol
P sensors v and u are able to verify that sensors in Γ′ are faking.
u
C− correct nodes
C’− virtual correct nodes
vl
Γ
Γ ’−virtual faking nodes
− faking nodes
Figure 3.3: Second execution.
Now let us consider the second execution (see figure 3.3). In the second execution sensors
in C and Γ′ are swapped. Thus sensors in Γ has to be located on the other side of straight
line l symmetrically. Now virtual faking sensors in Γ′ can imitate the first execution of the
correct sensors in C. Correct sensors in C behave like virtual sensors in Γ′ in first execution.
This is because the virtual sensors in Γ′ in the first execution behaved like correct sensors
and additionally they claimed that sensors from C were located in C′ (see figure 3.3). Now Γ
is really located in the previous location of C′ and the sensors in C are correct. Thus sensors
v and u are not able to distinguish between the first and the second execution. Sensors v
and u will have to decide that C is set of faking sensors. This is because v and u have made
RR n° 9999
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such decision in first execution and v and u is not able to distinguish between these two
executions. 2
INRIA
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Chapter 4
Protocol based on RSS ranging
technique
In this section, we consider that sensors use RSS technique to measure distance. We are
assuming that each correct sensor has a fixed common transmission signal strength of Ss.
The faking sensors can change their transmission signal strength and send suitable fake
position to other sensors. Let F be a faking sensor that changes its signal strength S
′
s
and sends a suitable fake position F ′ to other correct sensors. Sensor v can estimate the
distance, d̂ from the receive signal strength (RSS) by Frii’s transmission equation assuming
the common signal strength Ss has been used, according to the assumption in section 2.
d̂2 = c
Ss
Sr
=⇒ d̂2 = Ss
S′s
d2 . . . (2)
where c =
(
λ
4π
)2
, Sr = c
S
′
s
d2
, and d is the distance from v to the actual position of F .
We show that Protocol FindMap(⌈n2 ⌉ − 1) can be adapted to this model provided that
n− 3− f > f , i.e. the total number of faking sensors is at most ⌊n2 ⌋− 2 and no four correct
sensors are located on a particular circle. In this variant of the protocol, a sensor v considers
sensor u faking if the number of accusations messages for u is at least ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1.
Lemma 1 Let F be a faking sensor, and P1 and P2 be two correct sensors. There exists a
position (xf , yf) for F such that F is always able to fake a position F
′ = (x′f , y
′
f ) to both P1
and P2, with xf 6= x′f , and yf 6= y′f by changing its signal strength from S to S′.
Proof: The faking sensor, F changes its signal strength from Ss to S
′
s and sends a corre-
sponding fake position (x′f , y
′
f ) to P1 and P2 such that
d̂1
2
=
Ss
S′s
d1
2 and d̂2
2
=
Ss
S′s
d2
2
RR n° 9999
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’
P2
P1
F
F
Figure 4.1: An example showing a faking sensor F can supply its suitable false position F ′
to correct sensors P1 and P2 by changing its signal strength.
Where d̂1 and d̂2 are the estimated distances measured by P1 and P2 respectively from the
RSS of F and (x′f , y
′
f ) is the point of intersection of the two circles centering at P1 and P2
with radius d̂1 and d̂2 respectively according to the figure 4.1, d1 and d2 are the distances
from the actual position (xf , yf ) of F to P1 and P2 respectively
Then P1 and P2 can not able to detect the inconsistency of the fake position (x
′
f , y
′
f) of
F such that xf 6= x′f , and yf 6= y′f . 2
Lemma 2 Let F be a faking sensor, and P1 and P2 be two correct sensors. There exists a
position (xf , yf ) for F such that F can always choose a fake position F
′ = (x′f , y
′
f ) for both
P1 and P2, with xf 6= x′f , and yf 6= y′f by changing its signal strength. Then the possible
fake locations for F ′ are placed on a circular arc.
Proof: From lemma 1 we know that d̂1
d1
=
√(Ss
S
′
s
)
and d̂2
d2
=
√(Ss
S
′
s
)
that is d̂1
d1
= d̂2
d2
or d̂1
d̂2
= d1
d2
implies d̂1
d̂2
= δ where δ = d1
d2
= constant, for a pair of sensors P1 and P2.
If (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are the coordinates of P1 and P2 then the possible location of the
(x′f , y
′
f) is
(x − x1)2 + (y − y1)2
(x − x2)2 + (y − y2)2
= δ2
=⇒ x2 + y2 − 2
(
x1−δ
2x2
1−δ2
)
x− 2
(
y1−δ
2y2
1−δ2
)
y + x1
2+y1
2
−δ2(x2
2+y2
2)
1−δ2 = 0
Which is an equation of circle, where δ =
√ (xf−x1)2+(yf−y1)2
(xf−x2)2+(yf−y2)2
.
Now we have to prove that (x′f , y
′
f ) can lay only on F1FF2 part of circular arc as shown
in figure 4.2. Where F1 and F2 are the point of intersection of two circle of transmission
range centering at P1 and P2 such that at least one of the circles is its maximum transmission
range.
We can prove this by contradiction. Suppose, (x′f , y
′
f ) laying on the counterpart of the
circular arc F1FF2. Then it is not possible by F to pretend its fake position to P1 and P2
INRIA
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F
P2
P1
F’
F1
F2
Figure 4.2: An example showing possible locations (F1FF2) of the fake position (x
′
f , y
′
f )
than can be supplied by faking sensor F for a pair correct sensors P1 and P2 by changing
its signal strength.
simultaneously. Since counterpart of the circular arc F1FF2 does not belong to the common
transmission of P1 and P2, hence proved. 2
Lemma 3 Let F be a faking sensor, and P1, P2, P3 be three correct sensors on a circle.
There exists a position (xf , yf ) for F and positions (x1, y1), (x2, y2) and (x3, y3) such that
F is always able to fake a position F ′ = (x′f , y
′
f ) to P1, P2 and P3 such that xf 6= x′f , and
yf 6= y′f .
Proof: From Lemma 1 and 2, faking sensor F = (xf , yf) can fake its position F
′ = (x′f , y
′
f )
F
P1 P2
’
P3
F
’
P1 P2
P3
F
F
Figure 4.3: An example showing a faking sensor F can lie about its position by changing
signal strength to three correct sensors.
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to two correct sensors P1, P2 by changing its signal strength from Ss to S
′
s such that
P1F
′ : P1F = λ and P2F
′ : P2F = λ where λ =
√Ss
S
′
s
and P1F
′ = d̂1, P1F = d1, P2F
′ = d̂2,
P2F = d2.
We have to prove that there exist a sensor P3 with coordinates (x3, y3) such that P3
can not able to detect the inconsistency of fake position (x′f , y
′
f ), i.e., P3 has to locate at
a position like P1 and P2 such that P3F
′ : P3F = λ as shown in figure 4.3. Therefore
FF ′ : F ′P3 = (1 − λ) : λ Therefore (x3, y3) =
(
x′f−λxf
1−λ ,
y′f−λyf
1−λ
)
. From geometry we know
that only one circle pass through three fix points, hence proved. 2
Lemma 4 Let F be a faking sensor, and P1, P2 be correct sensors. There exists a position
(xf , yf) for F and positions (x1, y1), (x2, y2) such that F is always able to fake a position
F ′ = (x′f , y
′
f) to P1 and P2 such that xf 6= x′f , and yf 6= y′f . Then F also can fake the
position (x′f , y
′
f ) to more Pi’s if and only if they lay on a particular circle.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that faking sensor F can fix a fake position F ′ on the circular
arc F1FF2 with a suitable changed signal strength (S
′) such that P1 and P2 can not able to
detect the inconsistency as shown in figure 4.4.
F
F1
F2
1 P2
F’
P
P3
P
Figure 4.4: An example showing a faking sensor F can lie about its position by changing
signal strength to multiple number of correct sensors which are laying on a particular circle.
Let P is a variable point such that it keeps the same ratio
√Ss
S
′
s
(= λ) like P1 and P2
with F and F ′. Then P also can not able to detect the inconsistency of the fake position
F ′. If d̂p is the distance between P and F
′ and dp is the distance between P and F then
d̂p
dp
= λ
Therefore the possible location of the point P is
(x−x′f )
2+(y−y′f )
2
(x−xf )2+(y−yf )2
= λ2
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=⇒ x2 + y2 − 2
(
x′f−λ
2xf
1−λ2
)
x− 2
(
y′f−λ
2yf
1−λ2
)
y +
x′f
2+y′f
2
−λ2(xf
2+yf
2)
1−λ2 = 0
This is an equation of circle with respect to the given fake position F ′ of F and P1 and
P2 as shown in figure 4.4. Therefore, F pretends the fake position F
′ to the sensors which
are laying only on the particular circle. 2
Theorem 3 Let F be a faking sensor, and P1, P2, P3 be three correct sensors on a circle.
If there exist a sensor P4 which does not lay on the same circle, P4 is able to detect the
inconsistency of F .
Proof: From lemma 3 faking sensor F can convey the fake position F ′ to P1, P2, P3,
provided circles with radius d̂1 = λd1, d̂2 = λd2, and d̂3 = λd3 centering at P1, P1, and P1
respectively intersect at F ′, where λ =
√(Ss
S
′
s
)
.
’
P1
P3
F
P2
P4
F
Figure 4.5: An example showing a that if four sensors P1, P2, P3, P4 do not lay in a particular
circle then faking sensor F can be detected by sensor P4 which is not laying on the circle.
As P4 not on the circle then d̂4 6= λd4 as in figure 4.5 implies d̂4 6= d(P4, F ′), where
d(P4, F
′) is the distance from P4 to F
′ calculated from coordinates of F ′. Hence P4 can able
to detect the inconsistency of faking node F . 2
Corollary 1 The protocol FindMap(⌈n2 ⌉ − 1) identifies all faking sensors in the model
where faking sensors can corrupt RSS ranging technique, provided that n − f − 3 > f and
no four sensors are located on the same circle and no three sensors are co-linear.
Proof: Let us consider a faking sensor F , which fakes its transmission power. Theorem
3 guarantees that in each set of four correct sensors there exists a sensor, which detects
inconsistency on distance to F . Thus each faking sensor will be accused by at least n−f−3
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correct sensors. By inequality n − f − 3 > f the number of correct sensors that accuse F
is at least ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1 and the number of faking sensors is at most ⌊n2 ⌋ − 2. Thus each faking
sensor will be found faking and no correct sensor will be found faking. If faking node F does
not change its transmission power but only lies about its position then at least one on three
no-linear correct sensors will detect inconsistency. 2
Theorem 3 can be also applied in the protocol for the model of trusted sensors. In the
protocol presented in [3], we can use theorem 3 to find deployment of the minimum number
of hidden stations required to detect faking nodes.
Corollary 2 If the four hidden stations are not located on the same circle and no three
stations are co-linear then one of the stations will always detect a faking node.
Corollary 2 remains true provided the faking node’s transmission reaches all hidden
stations and it is not allowed to use directional antennas. Since the verifiers are hidden to
the faking node in the model of [3], the latter has very low chances to consistently fake its
position even with directional antennas.
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Chapter 5
Protocol based on ToF-like
ranging techniques
In this chapter, we first discuss how faking sensors can corrupt the two SToF and DAT
ranging techniques:
1. In case the SToF ranging technique is used by Sensor u, u first transmits a message
attaching the time of transmission ts into the message. Sensor v, which receives the
message from sensor u at time tr, estimates the distance based on delay t = tr− ts and
radio signal propagation speed sr, d̂(v, u) = srt. So, it is possible that a faking sensor
can prevent sensor v from computing the real distance by faking the transmission time
ts.
2. In case the DAT ranging technique is used, Sensor u transmits each message simulta-
neously with two signals (e.g. RF and US signals). Sensor v then records the difference
of arrival time t between RF signal and US signal. This can be done using only a local
clock at v. Thus no global time is required. Then, Sensor v computes distance d̂(v, u)
based on t, propagation speed sr of RF signal and propagation speed su of US sig-
nal. In this case, a faking sensor may prevent a correct sensor v from computing real
distance by delaying one of the two simultaneous transmissions.
Now we show that corrupting SToF and DAT ranging technique has the same affect on
correct sensors.
Lemma 5 If the ranging is evaluated with SToF technique and faking sensor F shifts real
transmission time then all correct sensors compute the real distance to sensor F increased
or decreased by the same length b.
Proof: Let us assume that faked sensor F shifts its real transmission time by t′. Then
all the correct sensors will compute the distance modified by b = srt
′, where sr is the radio
signal propagation speed. 2
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Lemma 6 If the ranging is evaluated with DAT technique and faking sensor F introduces
shift t′ 6= 0 between the RF and US transmissions, then all correct sensors compute the real
distance to the sensor F increased or decreased by the same length b.
Proof: Since the faking sensor shifts the two transmissions by time t′ then the difference
in arrivals time of the signals will be t + t′ where t is original difference for t′ = 0. Each
correct sensor will compute d̂ based on the following equation.
t + t′ =
d̂
sr
− d̂
su
Thus the real distance will be modified by
b =
t′
1/sr − 1/su
in all correct sensors. 2
Since the corruption on SToF and DAT has the same result we can formulate the following
theorem for both ranging techniques.
Theorem 4 If the distance evaluation is done with SToF or DAT techniques and no six
sensors are located on the same hyperbola and no three sensors are co-linear, then at least
one of six correct sensors detects inconsistency in faked transmission.
Proof:
Let us assume that faking sensor F enlarges its distance against the correct sensors by
b. The case when sensor reduces its distance is symmetric. By lemma 5 and 6 there are
at most two faked locations F ′ and F ′′ for faking sensor F , which guarantee consistency
against sensors P1 and P2 (see figure 5.1). Let us assume that sensor F decides for faked
location F ′.
Now we will find the set of correct sensors, which will not detect the inconsistency. We
consider two cases:
1. The first case is when distance c between F ′ and F is strictly larger than b (see figure
5.2). Each correct sensors P , which cannot detect inconsistency on distance to F , has
to meet d(P, F ) = d̂(P, F ). The condition d(P, F ) = d̂(P, F ) can be transformed into
the distances on the plane |F ′P | = |FP |+ b. Based on this condition we can came up
with system of equations for sensors in S = {P : d(P, F ) = d̂(P, F )}.
x2 + y2 = z2
x2 + (y − c)2 = (z + b)2
(5.1)
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3
l
F
F’
F’’
B
P1 P2
P
Figure 5.1: Figure shows that sensor F can change its position to F ′ and consistently lie
against sensor P3 which is located in the middle of segment FB. Length of segment F
′B is
b.
3
F
F’
B
l
P
Figure 5.2: We assume that |FF ′| > b. Figure shows set S of correct sensors located on
the hyperbola, which cannot detect inconsistency. That is for each correct sensor P located
on the hyperbola the distance |F ′P | is equal to |FP |+ b
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Where |FP | = z, x, y are the coordinates of correct sensor P ∈ S. We assume that
F = (0, 0) and F ′ = (0, c). Next we can find the equation of the hyperbola.
x2 + (y − c)2 = (
√
x2 + y2 + b)2
x2 + y2 − 2yc + c2 = x2 + y2 + 2b
√
x2 + y2 + b2
(−2yc + c2 − b2)2 = 4b2(x2 + y2)
4y2c2 − 4yc(c2 − b2) + (c2 − b2)2 = 4b2(x2 + y2)
4y2c2 − 4yc(c2 − b2) + (c2 − b2)2 − 4b2y2 = 4b2x2
4(c2 − b2)y2 − 4c(c2 − b2)y + (c2 − b2)2 = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(4y2 − 4cy + c2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)((2y − c)2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(2y − c)2 − b2(c2 − b2) = 4b2x2
(c2 − b2)(2y − c)2 − 4b2x2 = b2(c2 − b2)
(c2 − b2)(2y − c)2 − 4b2x2 = b2(c2 − b2)
(2y − c)2
b2
− 4x
2
c2 − b2 = 1 (5.2)
The five sensors uniquely determine the hyperbola. Thus the sixth sensor, which is
not located on the hyperbola by our assumption, will detect inconsistency.
2. The second case is when distance c between F ′ and F is at most b (see figure 5.3).
We will show that P1 or P2 will have to detect inconsistency. The distance measured
using coordinates by Pi for i = 1, 2 has to be exactly |FPi| + b to prevent sensor Pi
from detecting inconsistency. By triangle inequality we have |F ′F | + |FPi| ≥ |F ′Pi|
for i = 1, 2. Thus the distance |F ′Pi| measured by Pi with a ranging technique is at
most |FPi|+ b. Sensor Pi for i = 1, 2 will measure required distance when sensors F ′,
F and Pi are co-linear. This will happen for at most one sensor. This is because we
assume that no three sensors are co-linear.
2
Theorem 4 allows us to modify the protocol FindMap so that it works in the model in
which faking sensors can corrupt the SToF or DAT ranging technique.
Corollary 3 The protocol FindMap(⌈n2 ⌉ − 2) identifies all faking sensors, in the model
where faking sensors can corrupt SToF or DAT ranging techniques, provided n− f − 5 > f
and no six sensors are located on the same hyperbola and no three sensors are co-linear.
Proof: Let us consider a faking sensor F . Theorem 4 guarantees that in each set of six
correct sensors there exists a sensor which detects inconsistency on distance to F . Thus each
faking sensor will be accused by at least correct n−f−5 sensors. By inequality n−f−5 > f
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2
F’
F
P P1
Figure 5.3: We assume FF ′ ≤ b Figure shows that faking sensor F cannot change its position
to F ′ consistently against sensors P1 and P2. That is F
′P1 < |FP1|+ b or F ′P2 < |FP2|+ b
allowing sensor P1 or P2 to detect inconsistency.
the number of correct sensors that accuse F is at least ⌈n2 ⌉ − 2 and the number of faking
sensors is at most ⌊n2 ⌋− 3. Thus each faking sensor will be find faking and no correct sensor
will be found faking. 2
Theorem 4 can be also applied in the protocol for the model of trusted sensors [3]. We
can use theorem 4 to compute the deployment of the minimum number of hidden stations
required to detect faking nodes.
Corollary 4 If the six hidden stations are not located on the same hyperbola and no three
stations are co-linear then one of the stations always detect a faking node.
Corollary 4 is true provided the attacker’s transmission reaches all the hidden stations
and attacker is not allowed to use directional antennas. Since the verifiers are hidden to
the faking node, the latter has very low chance to consistently fake its position even with
directional antennas.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
We proposed a secure positioning deterministic protocol for WSN that performs in the most
general NTS model. Although the previous protocol of Hwang et al. [13] is probabilistic
(and thus, unlike ours, can not give certain results), it is interesting to see if the certainty
of the result comes with a price (with respect to the number of exchanged messages to
solve the problem). In [13], each sensor announces one distance at a time in a round robin
fashion (otherwise the faking node could hold its own announcement, collect all correct nodes
informations, and send a consistent range claim), inducing n(n−1) sent messages, an overall
O(n2) message complexity. In our case, n coordinate messages are sent in round one, and
n accusation messages are sent in round two, overall a O(n) message complexity. However,
from a information complexity point of view, the two approaches are equivalent, since the
exchanged messages in our protocol can be n-sized (inducing n2 information in both cases).
To conclude, we would like to mention two interesting open questions:
1. Our protocol makes some synchrony hypotheses to separate between rounds and filter
faking nodes. It is worth investigating to determine the exact model assumptions that
are necessary and sufficient to solve the same problem in the NTS model with respect
to synchrony.
2. Our network model assumes that correct nodes are within range of every other node.
Extending our result to WSN with fixed ranges for every node is a challenging task,
especially since previous results on networks facing intermittent failures and attacks [6,
7, 18] are written for rather stronger models (i.e. wired secure communications) than
that of this paper.
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